Industrial investment in Colonial India was segregated by the export oriented industries, such as tea and jute that relied on British firms and the import substituting cotton textile industry that was dominated by Indian firms. The literature emphasizes discrimination against Indian capital. Instead informational factors played an important role. British entrepreneurs knew the export markets and the Indian entrepreneurs were familiar with the local markets. The divergent flows of entrepreneurship can be explained by the comparative advantage enjoyed by social groups in information and the role of social networks in determining entry and creating separate spheres of industrial investment.
Introduction
Bombay and Calcutta, two metropolitan port cities, experienced very different patterns of industrial investment in colonial India. One was the hub of Indian mercantile activity and the other the seat of British business. The industries that relied on the export market attracted investment from British business groups in the city of Calcutta. Bombay, on the other hand, became the centre of the import substituting textile industry. Indian cotton traders from different communities moved from trade to production of cotton textiles. Few British entrepreneurs were present. British industrial interests exercised monopoly control over various industrial activities in Calcutta and the hinterland. British firms were set up in tea, jute and coal and here the presence of Indians was minimal.
Although geographical factors determined the location of these industries, who invested and why remain questions of interest. Cotton was grown in the hinterland was Bombay and tea and jute in the hinterland of Calcutta. History could matter too. Indian merchants in Bombay had a more dominant presence in Bombay. These merchants had a strong presence in internal as well in the Indian Ocean trade. In the cotton textiles industry around Bombay, most of the investment was by Indians, who had links with the trade in raw cotton. The trade in raw jute around Calcutta was also in the hands of Indian traders, but they were not involved in the investment in jute manufacturing until the First World War. Investment in tea, jute and coal in and around Calcutta came from the British. A puzzle is why did British entrepreneurs not take advantage of these profitable opportunities open to Indian merchants. Why did British and Indian investment stay separated? Why did British capital flow into some sectors and not to others? flows were influenced by the extent of knowledge that investors had of particular markets.
The information was transmitted through community networks creating separate spheres of investment. I argue that access to information about markets differed across social groups and gave an advantage to specific groups in specific markets. Conditional on the initial advantage, information flows within a network further accentuated the segregation of economic activity by social group and showed up in the different investment patterns in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay.
The paper is organized as follows: I start with a summary of the theoretical literature on long distance capital flows and informational constraints and presents a simple model to analyze the determinants of industrial investment in colonial India. This is followed by a discussion of the type and magnitude of industrial investment. The empirical section tests for discrimination in industrial investment and the role of social networks in entry into industrial activity. The final section concludes.
Informational Constraints and Capital Flows: A Simple Model of Informational Advantage
The recent literature on international capital flows provides a backdrop to my analysis of the Indian economy in colonial times. . 6 Only a quarter of British capital went to the Empire of which only 30 percent went to the colonies under British rule with India receiving two thirds. 7 Lucas, in his well-known paper, argued that British capital flows to India were low even during the colonial period when the threat of expropriation was low and returns 6 Lucas "Why doesn't capital flow" 7 Davis and Huttenback " The export of British finance"
were high. 8 The low volumes of capital flows could be explained if the imperial power had exploited its monopoly position and restricted capital flows to keep returns on capital high.
This does not seem to have been the case in British India. On the contrary, large inflows of capital into the railways were encouraged by guaranteeing favorable rates of return.
Bovenberg and Gordon set out a model of asymmetric information to explain why capital flows do not equalize returns across countries. They consider a situation where domestic investors are better informed about the quality of the investment project than foreign investors. Foreigners fear being overcharged and hesitate to buy equity. Thus asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors prevents capital from flowing to high return economies. 9 Empirical evidence from recent cross-country equity flows support the view that information asymmetries reduce the involvement of foreign investors. 10 Portes et al. estimate a gravity model for capital flows and find the distance and speed of information flows, measured by telephone connections, have significant effects. The results suggest that local producers have better information about local markets and foreign firms are not willing to undertake long distance investment even when political risks are minimal. These informational barriers may be reinforced by the absence of institutions that are effective in enforcing commercial contracts.
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In my framework, informational asymmetries are defined by social groups.
Information flows were easier within social groups and restricted across groups. Therefore if one member of a social group invested in a particular industry, others could be persuaded to invest in it too. Members of a community made similar decisions to diversify from trade 8 Lucas, Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries. 9 Bovenberg & Gordon, Why is Capital so Immobile Internationally. 10 We can think of two channels of information flow through social networks. The informational constraints faced by investors were different from those faced by entrepreneurs. Potential entrepreneurs had information about investment opportunities.
Potential investors were guided by the risk associated with buying shares in a foreign company. Familiarity with products could overcome this type informational constraint.
Reputational value of the entrepreneur could also be an advantage. Entrepreneurs decided which is a profitable enterprise and the investors chose whether to invest in the enterprise.
Investors' choice depended on who the entrepreneurs were and the type of industry.
An example of the first is that British savers invested in companies started by British entrepreneurs. An example for the second type of information is tea, where the product was present in the consumption basket of the average British consumer giving them an incentive to invest in this industry. I will return to this point in the next section.
For now, I focus on the informational constraints facing entrepreneurs. Potential entrepreneurs have different quality of information about investment opportunities. This information is shared with members of the community so that it influences their decisions to enter a particular industry. I put forward a simple model to illustrate the way in which 12 Tripathi and Mehta, Business Houses in Western India. 13 Timberg., The Marwaris, pp92-93 informational flows within a community give rise to a herding effect so that different communities specialize in different industries.
Consider two sectors and two communities. First, any initial entrant is a pioneer, who observes only imperfectly which niche is profitable. The pioneer has the option to enter either industry and select a niche. However, in compensation, such an entrant earns monopoly profits initially. Second, entrants from the same community become informed about the profitability of a niche once successful entry takes place. By entering the same industry, they face reduced risk, and this offsets the congestion arising from additional entry. On the other hand, entrants from a different community suffer from competition and the congestion and have no informational benefits. This produces a tendency towards segregation, with different communities specializing in distinct industries.
Assume for simplicity that there are two industries, A and B
In each industry, there are several niches , indexed by i ∈ 1,2,..,n}
Only one of these niches is profitable, and each of them has equal prior probability.
Let L be the loss suffered by entering an unprofitable niche. Let Gi be the gain from entering a profitable niche in industry i, i∈{A,B}.
We assume that Gi is a random variable that is independently and identically distributed according to density f on [G ,Ĝ] .
At each date t, individual has an investment opportunity, and can invest either in industry A or B, and must also choose a niche to enter in either industry.
He observes G A and G B , and also observes signals SA and SB, where Si ∈{1,2,...,n} is a signal of which niche is profitable. Si equals the profitable niche with probability p>(1/n), and with probability ((1-p)/(n-1) i t equals one of the other niches.
Thus the posterior probability of success of a niche for which a favorable signal is obtained is p, and the expected profit from entry (without any additional information), is Now consider any individual who follows the first entry. We assume that such an individual either belongs to the same community, C, as the first entrant, or to a different community, Ĉ. If he belongs to the same community, he observes the niche that the first entrant chose. He also observes an exit decision and learns if the first entrant's choice was the right one. Thus, he now believes that the probability that this niche is profitable is 1 rather than p. As in the models of herd behavior, 15 the follower will ignore his own information and the signal he observes and follow the first entrant. However, he has to share profits with the current incumbent , and his payoff is G i (2)<G i .
More generally, let G i (m) denote the profits when m firms are already in the market, which is assumed to be decreasing in m. Thus for any value of t G i , here exists m * G i such that at most m * firms can profitably enter. Note that this value of m * assumes that firms perfectly know which niche is profitable.
Notice that a following entrant of the same community also learns that the niche is not profitable if the first entrant exits after one period. If the follower observes a positive signal for a different niche, he assigns a higher probability p 1 > p .
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Consider now an individual who is from, Ĉ, a different community from that of the first entrant into industry i, and all previous entrants into the industry i.
Suppose that there are m entrants into this industry. Since he cannot observe the niche, his expected profit is
Since the posterior probability of success in a niche, where no signal is observed is (1-p)/(n-1), which is strictly less than 1/n<p, it is strictly worse to enter a niche where no signal is observed. 15 Banerjee, "A simple model" and Bikchandani et al, "Learning from behavior of others. The model here differs from the models of herd behaviour and the informational cascades as the follower observes whether the first entrant was successful or not, whereas in the herd behaviour literature outcomes are not observed.
Bayesian updating implies p 1 = (n-1)p/ (n-1)p + (n-2)(1-p) >p which is strictly less than the payoff of the first entrant. On the other hand, if no firm has entered industry j, his payoff from entering industry j is given by
Thus if G j >G i (m) and Gj≥Ĝ, he will prefer to enter industry j rather than i. In other words, an entrant from a different community Ĉ will prefer to enter a new industry as there is less competition from the existing firms and he does not have the same informational advantage as the members of the community C.
Let us consider industry dynamics under the assumption that G A ≃G B , that is profitability levels are close to each other in the two industries.
Let us assume that at each date, there are two possible entrants, one from each community.
Thus at date 1, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the two entrants will choose different industries. If one chooses industry A, the other will prefer industry B since monopoly profits in B will be greater than duopoly profits in A.
Now suppose that both entrants are successful. Then at date 2, each entrant has a choice between G i (2) with probability p (if he chooses the industry of a different community) or G j (2) with probability 1
Thus if he enters, he will choose the industry chosen by his community predecessor. This argument iterates --at any date that an entrant enters, he will choose the industry chosen by the predecessors in his community.
Of course, it is possible that one of the initial entrants, say from community Ĉ in industry B, chooses a wrong niche as he gets the wrong signal while the entrant from community C chooses the right niche. In this case, he will choose to exit, and the succeeding entrants from community Ĉ will not have full information on the profitability of the niche, whereas following entrants from community C will be fully informed about the profitable niche in industry A.
It is an equilibrium for the informed individual to choose industry A, earning G A (2)-c, while the uninformed individual chooses a niche in industry B, earning
Thus, even in this case, the pattern of industry specialization by different communities is sustained.
To summarize, the model incorporates the advantage of information flow through the community network in reducing risk for a member of the same social group and offsetting the congestion arising from additional entry. A member of the other social group face adverse effects competition and congestion without the benefit of better information. This produces a tendency towards segregation with different social groups specializing in different industries. Even unsuccessful entry by a member of the same community is informative as it narrows down the set of profitable niches and the entrants face reduced risk.
This model is ex ante symmetric so that each social group is equally likely to enter either industry. In reality, the British had better information about the export markets in tea and jute, while the Indians had better knowledge of the domestic market in cotton textiles.
This implies that the quality of signal, that is the value of p in the model would depend on the identity of the entrant. It is larger for the British in the export industries and larger for the Indian in the import substituting industries. Therefore ex ante the British were more likely to be the pioneer in the export industry and Indians in cotton textiles. The model implies that the herding effect would lead to persistence even if profitability was different in the two industries. To the extent the quality of the signal depended on prior knowledge of markets, there may be examples which run contrary to the simple model outlined, such as the presence of a few British firms in cotton textiles. Note that these entrepreneurs were also involved in the domestic cotton trade and therefore would have a higher p than a British firm not involved in cotton trade.
The model also assumes that the profitability of the industries is stationary over time and varies only with the number of entrants. This is a simplification and the model can Indians as well as British expatriates, for whom this was ideal investment opportunity. The capital for the rupee companies came from British civil servants, army personnel and traders. 23 These firms were run by managing agents or specialist management firms that owned shares, but were not required to have a majority shareholding. The managing agents managed companies across industries through long term agency contracts. They could be either British or Indian firms, the latter typically the Indian counterpart of the British agent.
In the context of India's industrial sector, firms are classified as British or India in relation to the managing agent. We can adopt a simple criterion to classify all sterling companies as British owned and managed. The picture is less clear for rupee companies.
Capital was raised in India and did not show up as direct inflow of foreign capital.
However, the managing agents were the Indian counterpart of the British agency firms and acted as an indicator of ownership. This is a reasonable assumption as all decisions were undertaken by these agents and the new issue of shares also relied on their reputation and social connections. investor, the managing agent associated with it had a reputation. 24 The managing agency system may be seen as an institutional innovation, which addressed the problem of informational constraints in long distance investment by providing a trustworthy name to the British investor. This system was universally adopted by British business in Asia.
Table1 shows the involvement of several leading managing agents in different industries.
British investors could invest in sterling or rupee companies. They could choose to invest in tea, cotton or jute or utilities such as railways. There were two types of British investors: those resident in Britain and those resident in India. The first group invested mainly in sterling companies in railways and public utilities and in tea, while the second invested in rupee companies in tea, jute and coal. Britain was the main market for tea, and consumers were familiar with the product. In India, it was still a consumption good largely unknown. Tea attracted large volumes of sterling investment in London. When the tea companies were floated in the 1860s and 1870s, it turned into a mania. On the other hand, jute was relatively unknown to the average British consumer and jute companies in Scotland might have might have been less risky. Only a handful of jute companies were registered in London. It was a product widely used in India for centuries and most of the capital was raised locally from British residents in India looking for profitable investment.
These Rupee companies in Calcutta were the ideal investment opportunity for the british residents in India.
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In the tea industry, which was the largest sector, most companies were sterling companies, while in jute and coal, the typical firm was a rupee company managed by the firms that were in the industry were small and produced poorer quality coal that was sold in the local market.
It was the market for cotton textiles was relatively unknown to the average British investor. Cotton textile firms in Lancashire exported to the Indian market, where the distribution was in the hands of Indian traders. These traders had knowledge of local market in cotton textiles and became entrepreneurs when the opportunity arose. The trade in raw cotton had been in the hands of these local merchants in Western India. They made large profits in the cotton famine, ready to be invested. The cotton traders came from specific communities, such as the Parsis and Bhatias, who had a long history in intraregional as well as Indian Ocean trade. One of main British firms that entered this industry had also been involved in the cotton trade and the other was set up by a British technician working in the industry.
39 Table 2 presents a summary of investment in industries in colonial India. Table 4 shows the breakdown of investment in sterling and rupee companies. Tea accounted for the largest of sterling investment in 1915. In jute and coal, investment was primarily in rupees and the magnitudes of investment were much smaller, not only in relation to sterling investment in tea, but also in comparison with rupee investment in cotton textiles. The two largest sectors of investment in 1915 were tea in Eastern India dominated by British companies and cotton textiles in Western India dominated by Indian companies.
Data on paid up capital allows us to track the changes in investment in rupee companies from 1880. Paid-up capital is likely to underestimate the total volume of investment as enterprises raised loans from banks, particularly British owned firms. Loans were obtained from machinery producers as well. 42 The British agents found it relatively easy to borrow from the banks in India. 43 This creates a distortion if some sectors have better access to loans. A more serious problem is that paid up capital in older firms will have a lower nominal value. Information is not detailed enough to correct for this.
Therefore investment in sectors with older firms will be underestimated further. Therefore it is difficult to argue that government support played an important role in the choice of investment.
A different view of discrimination is that British capital entered those sectors which were complementary to their domestic industrial interests. The discrimination view is important in the literature, but has not been tested empirically. In the next section, I put forward simple statistical tests to see if there were 55 Morris, Growth of large scale industry, p580 56 Sen, " Pattern of British enterprise" 57 Rutnagur, Bombay Industries: The Cotton Mills, p9. systematic differences in availability of capital and returns of return, which can explain the segregation of British and Indian business.
Measuring constraints
The empirical strategy adopted in this paper is to rule out explanations that suggest barriers to entry. If discrimination against Indian capital or the privileges enjoyed by British capital explain the different spheres investment, then we should be able to measure economic attributes that differ across industries Did the minimum efficient scale differ across sectors? If the Indian entrepreneurs had a disadvantage in raising capital through the stock market or had limited access to credit from the formal British owned banking sector, they would be more likely to enter industries where the initial capital outlay was lower. If scale economies did not matter then, in any given industry, firms started by Indians would tend to be smaller. I can test both propositions using firm-level data. Table 5 presents comparative start-up capital outlays required in different industries using both aggregate data from Rungta and firm-level information from various sources.
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It shows that the average paid up capital in cotton mills was lower compared to the paid up capital of an average jute mill right from the 1880s to 1910. However, this is not the case for the average coal or tea firm. The absence of Indians in these sectors indicates a relatively minor role of a capital constraint. Table 6 focuses on the two comparable industries cotton and jute and provides measures of machinery used and employment. 58 Morris suggests that initial investment in jute was about the same if not lower than the setting up cost in an average cotton mill and could not have deterred entry. Morris uses Rungta's estimates paid-up capital of Rs 933,000 in 1881 and Rs 1.5 million in 1901 in an average jute mill. However Rungta's data on cotton textiles show that the average paid-up capital in cotton mills was less than Rs 900,000 in both years.
Although the machinery employed is not directly comparable across the two sectors, the loom is the main equipment for weaving. Many cotton firms produced a large quantity of yarn as the finished product. Therefore cotton firms list the number of spindles and looms. I construct a measure of loom equivalent by aggregating spindles and looms in the cotton industry. (See table 6 for the details) Although the loom equivalent is higher for cotton mills, jute firms employed significantly more labor. This seeming anomaly is due to the aggregation problem. About two hundred spindles could be operated by one worker whereas one worker attended to one loom. Both capital outlay and number of workers were higher in the jute firm. The firm size and the minimum efficient scale could have given
Indian entrants a disadvantage if they were capital constrained. However, it has already been noted that such an argument cannot be used to explain the absence of Indian entrepreneurs in tea and coal.
The second test for the presence of a capital constraint is to see if there is difference in size between British and Indian firms, in industries where they co-exist. If capital constraint was systematically greater for the Indians, we might expect Indian firms to be smaller than British firms. I compare firms within the industries: cotton and jute. Note that Indians were the majority group in cotton, but a minority in jute the opposite holds for the jute industry. This procedure has the advantage that we can use a physical measure of capital, the loom equivalent, rather than a value measure, since we only make intra industry comparisons. On the basis of the measure of loom equivalent and looms, we can make comparisons across firms according to ownership for the year 1924. 59 Table 7 shows that in each industry, the majority group has the larger firm, although this difference is not 59 I have chosen the year 1924 as there was a significant group of Indian firms in the jute industry by this period. statistically significant. In the cotton textile industry in Bombay, the Indian firms on average were larger than British firms, while in the jute industry, British firms were larger.
Thus the initial hypothesis, that Indians were uniformly more capital constrained, is not borne out. Instead it appears that the minority group may face more difficulty in raising capital. If capital had been a constraint for Indian firms, then British firms would tend to be larger in all sectors.
I compute the capital-labor ratio intensities in mills run by different communities in the cotton textiles in Bombay to test for systematic differences. The only group which had a higher capital-labor ratio is the Sassoon group, reputed to be most efficient in the industry. The ratio was similar across all other groups and the British firms were not more capital intensive. (See table 8 The Bhatia merchants, who were the first Hindu entrepreneurs, also raised their own finances 60 70-80% of the authorized capital was paid up soon after the firm was set up. Small firms tended to sell a small number of high value shares and large firms tended to float shares of low face-value that could be taken up by a larger number of investors. 61 Although Davar had failed 60 Rutnagar, Bombay Industries, p46 61 Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, to find the financial support in three years earlier, by 1854 raising capital for a cotton mill in
Bombay did not prove difficult. Oriental mills sold 500 high value shares of Rupees 2500 each, but had to limit subscription to four share per person due to the high demand. 62 On the other hand British firms found it more difficult to raise capital in the Bombay region. Greaves, Cotton & Company, the largest European managing agent controlling seven spinning mills was unable to raise capital to diversify into weaving. 63 European capital was no more than 10-20% of total capital invested in cotton. In Calcutta, the average jute or tea firm did not have problems in mobilizing capital.
Another constraint that could have deterred entry of Indian entrepreneurs is the rate of profit. Did profit rate differ across industries? If the Indians were guided by higher returns and were capital constrained, then the profit rates should have been higher in cotton textiles although there are no obvious reasons why British firms were not attracted by higher profits.
Existing estimates suggest an average rate of profit of 9 percent in jute and 10 percent in cotton. 64 Table 9 shows the profit rates and dividend rate across sectors using firm level data.
There were no systematic differences in profits across export and import substituting sectors.
Cotton and jute showed comparable mean profit rates, while tea had a higher return. Coal shows a much lower profit rate with the median firm making no profit. Higher dividends were paid in tea, but comparable rates were paid in jute and cotton. If lower median profit rate discouraged British business in cotton, this was clearly not the case in coal. Lastly, I test if profit rate and dividend rate differed across British and Indian firms in the cotton textiles industry. Indian firms show a lower profit rate compared to British firms, but paid out higher dividends. A T test shows that these differences are not statistically significant. The empirical 62 Morris, Growth of large scale industries, p575. 63 Morris, Growth of large scale industry, p579. 64 Morris, Growth of large scale industry, p572 exercise shows no evidence that Indian entrepreneurs were drawn to industries with particularly high rates of return or that capital constraint alone determined the industrial divide between British and Indian capital
Social Network Effect
The role of social networks in economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa has been highlighted by Fafchamps when information about the market is limited and involves search costs. 65 Evidence from traders in Madagascar finds that family ties were important in starting businesses, but less important in the long run. 66 In contemporary India, the effect of social network in entry has been explored in the context of the diamond industry.
The study finds that the entry of a few members of a community in the diamond trade led to further entry from the same community which had few outside options. 67 In 19 th century India too community ties were important in decisions to enter into industrial activity. These caste boundaries were clearly defined. Caste and community networks had been important If education and western contact were the driving factors, then we should observe a high level of human capital to be the common factor among the pioneers rather than the social network. The first entrants belonged to the Parsi community and as a community they enjoyed high level of human capital making it difficult to distinguish between the effects of human capital and social network. emerged. These traders became entrepreneurs two decades later. 83 The Marwaris started to o buy shares in British owned jute firms registered in Calcutta in Calcutta that paid high dividends. They also gave loans to cash strapped British firms in return for block shares.
The Table 10 shows the pattern of entry in Bombay's textile industry by social groups. Table 11 presents the probability of entry. The results show an association between the cumulative presence of members of a community and the probability of entry. Total number of firms in the industry also increased the probability of entry, but the effect was much smaller, confirming that social network effect mattered for decisions to enter. In the jute industry too, for the first fifty years, the British firms were the only social group. Note: There were many smaller agents, some managing one company in any one sector and more in others, some concentrated in one particular sector. 
